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SHOULD THE DOCTRINE OF ULTRA VIRES
BE DISCARDED?
CHARLES E. CARPENTER
Should not the doctrine of ultra vires be entirely discarded? Has
it not made for complexity and confusion in the law? Is there any
sound basis for it, any excuse for its existence? And will its abandon-
ment not leave the law in a more satisfactory state?
Let us consider the condition in which we find the law as it relates
to ultra vires, examine into the grounds upon which the doctrine is based
and attempt to forecast the result of a complete abandonment of the
doctrine.
The powers which a corporation is authorized to exercise are set forth
in its charter, or in its articles of incorporation. Statutes, too, may
place express prohibitions upon the exercise of certain powers. If the
corporation enters into a transaction which is beyond the powers
expressly or impliedly contained in the charter or articles of incorpora-
tion or in violation of the statutory restriction, the transaction is said
to be ultra vires, i. e., beyond the powers of the corporation. What
legal consequences are attached to such transactions? The doctrine of
ultra vires is the means by which the courts have worked out the answer
to this question. The answer is not clear and simple, but contradictory,
uncertain, and frequently unjust. Some courts have said the state
alone can object, but most courts have gone further and have to a greater
or less extent denied validity to the transaction between the parties. It
does not seem to be an exaggeration to say that there are no sound
theories consistently applied and there are many unsound ones dis-
cordantly applied. In the first place there exist two fundamental con-
ceptions as to the nature of a corporation and-its powers, diametrically
opposed to each other and responsible for much confusion. According
to one concept the corporation is an artificial entity deriving its existence
and its powers from the state; and according to the other it is a group
of persons with general powers acting as a unit in some respects but
prohibited from acting as a unit beyond the authority granted.
THE CONDITION OF THE ENGLISH LAW RELATING TO ULTRA VIRES
In England both views prevail. Royal charter corporalions have the
capacity of natural persons and their contracts though ultra vires are
valid." The Crown, however, has the right to repeal letters patent for
entering into ultra vires transactions.2 Statutory corporations, that is,
See British South Africa Co. v. De Beers [igio] I Ch. 354, 375.
2 See Eastern Archipelago Co. v. The Queen (1853, K. B.) 2 El. & B1. 856 and
Brice, Doctrine of Ultra Vires (2d. ed. 1877) 9o8.
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corporations created by special act of Parliament, or organized under a
general act, on the other hand, have no power beyond that granted and
their ultra vires contracts are voidV It is difficult to conceive of a
sufficient ground for the distinction which the English law takes between
royal charter and statutory corporations and little can be said for the
soundness or the justice of the law which treats all the ultra vires con-
tracts of statutory corporations as void. Yet this distinction in the
English law has not introduced confusion or complexity so far as rights
of action on the contract are concerned for all ultra vires contracts of
crown corporations are treated as valid and of statutory corporations
as void.
THE CONDITION OF THE AMERICAN LAW RELATING TO ULTRA VIRES
On the other hand the American law stands out by contrast in its
lack of the merit of easy statement. In speking of the law of ultra
vires Judge Thompson has said :4
"After having given a long and attentive study to the subject, the
writer affirms that the Anglo-American law with reference to it is in
a state of hopeless and inextricable confusion; that contradictory
decisions are constantly rendered by the same courts; that opposing
principles, tending to contrary results, jostle and crowd each other
... and that the judge seizes upon one of these principles to-day and
to-morrow upon another, and enlarges it or applies it according to
the seeming exigencies of justice in the particular case."
Machen says,5
"The authorities are in utter confusion. No court consistently adheres
to either view-the view that a corporation cannot make an ultra vires
contract, or the view that ultra vires contracts are illegal. Indeed, diffi-
culty is often experienced in determining upon which theory even in
a single case a court has acted. To attempt to unravel the tangle so
as to show what rules of law are adopted in each state would be
a protracted if not an impossible task."
THE LAW WHERE THE THEORY OF SPECIAL POWERS PREVAILS
In accord with the English conception of the nature of corporate
powers as applied to statutory corporations and proceeding upon the
theory that the corporation lacks power to make ultra vires contracts
there are decisions of the Uniied States Supreme Court,6 the other.
'Ashbury Ry. Co. v. Riche (1875) L. R. 7 H. L. 653; Great North-West Ry.
Co. v. Charlebois [1899, P. C.] A. C. 114.
'Thompson, The Doctrine of Ultra Vires in Relation to Private Corporation
(1894) 28 AM. L. REv. 376. Quoted in Pepper, The Unauthorized or Prohibited
Exercise of Corporate Power (1894) 9 HAuv. L. REv. 255, 272 with disapproval.5 Machen, Modern Law of Corporations (i9o8) sec. lO21.
'Central Transportation Co. v. Pullman's Car Co. (i89i) 139 U. S. 24, 59, i
Sup. Ct. 478, 488.
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federal courts,7 and of the courts of the states of Alabama,8 Illinois, 9
Maine, 10  Maryland," Massachusetts, 12  Tennessee, 3  and possibly
Vermont 4 to the effect that ultra vires contracts are void. Thus it
has been held that where the corporation has made an ultra vires lease
of its property it could not recover rents for the period of occupation, 5
or against the lessee on the covenants in the lease;"' that a national
bank holding stock in another corporation ultra vires was not subject
to the statutory double liability of stockholders, 7 nor subject to being
assessed as a shareholder though it is receiving the dividends ;i8 that an
insurance contract not executed according to the provisions of its
charter 9 and a note given for the purchase of a steamboat ultra vires20
were void. On this theory, where the contract was ultra vires it has
been held that there could be no recovery on a contract of guaranty,2'
or an action maintained for the price of goods sold,22 or for money
loaned,23 or the balance due upon the purchase of shares.24
'National Trust & Credit Co. v. Orcutt & Son Co..(igig, C. C. A. 7th) 259
Fed. 83o; Lewis v. Fifth-Third National Bank (1921, C. C. A. 6th) 274 Fed. 587;
Wn. Filene's Sons Co. v. Gilchrist Co. (x922, C. C. A. Ist) 284 Fed. 664.
' See Chewacla Lime Works v. Disinukes, Frierson & Co. (1888) 87 Ala. 344,
347, 6 So. 122, 123; Steiner v. Steiner (18go) 12o Ala. 128, 141, 26 So. 494, 497.
'National Home Ass. v. Home Savings Bank (1899) 181 IIl. 35, 54 N. E. 61g;
Best Brewing Co. v. Klassen (igoo) 185 Ill. 37, 57 N. E. 2o, 50 L. R. A. 765;
Calumet Co. v. Conkling (igi6) 273 Ill. 318, 112 N. E. 982; Mercantile Trust Co.
v. Kastor (1916) 273 I1. 332, 112 N. E. 988.
"Brunswick Gas Light Co. v. United Gas Co. (1893) 85 Me. 532, 27 Alt. 525.
Western Maryland R. Co. v. Blue Ridge Co. (29o5) lo2 Md. 3o7, 62 Alt. 351.
But cf. Black v. First National Bank (19o3) 96 Md. 399, 54 AtI. 88.
'Davis v. Old Colony R. Co. (1881) 131 Mass. 258. But contra: Slater
Woolen Co. v. Lanib (1886) 143 Mass. 42o, 9 N. E. 823.
'Marble Co. v. Harvey (1892) 92 Tenn. 115, 2o S. W. 427; Miller v. Ins. Co.
(1893) 92 Tenn. 167, 21 S. W. 39. But cf. Tennessee Ice Co. v. Raine (igoi)
107 Tenn. 151, 64 S. W. 29.
"Metropolitan Stock Exch. v. National Batk (9o3) 76 Vt 303, 57 Atl. ioi.
"5 Central Transportation Co. v. Pullman's Car Co., supra note 6; McCormick
v. Market Bank (897) 165 U. S. 538, 17 Sup. Ct. 433. See Thomas v. R. R.
Co. (188o) ioi U. S. 71, 86.
"Brunswick Gas Light Co. v. United Gas Co., supra note IO.
", California Bank v. Kennedy (1897) 167 U. S. 362, 175 Sup. Ct. 831; Concord
First National Bank v. Hawkins (1899) 174 U. S. 364, 19 Sup. Ct 739; First
National Bank of Ottawa v. Converse (igo6) 200 U. S. 425, 26 Sup. Ct. 3o6;
Merchants' Bank v. Wehrinann (29o6) 202 U. S. 295, 26 Sup. Ct. 613; contra:
National Bank v. Case (1878) 99 U. S. 628.
"Shaw v. National German Ar.erican Bank (19o4, C. C. A. 8th) 132 Fed. 658.
'Head & Amory v. The Providence Ins. Co. (18o4, U. S.) 2 Cranch, 127.
"Pearce v. The Madison & Indianapolis R. Co. (1858, U. S.) 21 How. 441.
'Best Brewing Co. v. Klassen, supra note 9; Davis v. Old Colony R. Co.,
supra note 12; Western Maryland R. Co. v. Blue Ridge Co., supra note ii;
William Filene's Sons Co. v. Gilchrist Co., supra note 7.
' Chewacla Lime Works v. Dinnukes, Frierson & Co., supra note 8.
"Mercantile Trust Co. v. Kastor, supra note 9.
'
4Marble Co. v. Harvey, supra note 13.
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Perhaps the clearest and the strongest statement of this view is to be
found in the opinion of Justice Gray of the United States Supreme
Court in the case of Central Transportation Co. v. Pullman's Car Co.
25
where he said:
"A contract of a corporation which is ultra vires in the proper sense,
that is to say, outside the object of its creation as defined in the law
of its organization, and therefore beyond the powers conferred upon
it by the legislature, is not, voidable only, but wholly void, and of no
legal effect. The objection to the contract is, not merely that the
corporation ought not to have made it, but that it could not make it.
The contract cannot be ratified by either party, because it could not
have been authorized by either. No performance on either side can
give the unlawful contract any validity, or be the foundation of any
right of action upon it."
It is obvious that it is impossible consistently with this theory of
special capacities, or absence of all capacity beyond intra vires transac-
tions to treat ultra vires contracts other than as void. These courts
have recognized this. In National Home Association v. Bank, the
court, in speaking of an ultra vires contract, said :26
"There would, of course, be no power to confirm or ratify a contract
of that kind, because the power to enter into it is absolutely wanting. If
there is no power to make the contract there can be no power to ratify
it, and it would seem clear that the opposite party could not take away
the incapacity and give the contract vitality by doing something under
it. It would be contradictory to say that a contract is void for an
absolute want of power to make it and yet may become legal and valid
as a contract, by way of estoppel, through some other act of the party
under such incapacity, or some act of the other party chargeable by
law with notice of the want of power."
Yet these courts which have approved the emphatic language of Justice
Gray in the Pullman case and have held ultra vires contracts void
because the corporation had no power to make them, have taken a
squarely contrary position and have made many decisions upholding the
validity of ultra vires contracts. They have held that where a corpora-
tion has taken property real or personal as security ultra vires,27 or
where the corporation has been a conduit of title ultra vires,28 or where
Supra note 6, at p. 59, 1I Sup. Ct. at p. 488.
Supra note 9, at p. 44, 54 N. E. at p. 621.
Schuyler Nat. Bank v. Gadsden (1903) 191 U. S. 451, 24 Sup. Ct 129; Nat.
Bank v. Matthews (x878) 98 U. S. 621 ; Nat. Bank v. Whitney (i88o) 1O3 U. S.
99; Nat. Bank v. Stewart (1882) 107 U. S. 676, 2 Sup. Ct. 778 (after stock
unlawfully accepted had been sold, no recovery of proceeds) ; Logan Cty. Bank
,v. Townsend (i891) 139 U. S. 67, 11 Sup. Ct. 496; see Tones v. Guaranty &
Indemnity Co. (188o) 1oi U. S. 622, 628; Reynolds v. First Bank of Crawfords-
ville (1884) 112 U. S. 405, 413, 5 Sup. Ct 213, 217.
' Kerfoot v. Farmers Bank (1910) 218 U. S. 281, 31 Sup. Ct. 14; see Blair v.
City of Chicago (1905) 201 U. S. 400, 450, 26 Sup. Ct. 427, 436; Lantry V. Wallace
(igoo) 182 U. S. 536, 21 Sup. Ct. 878; Fritts v. Palmer (1889) 132 U. S. 282,
1o Sup. Ct. 93.
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the grantor or his heirs attack the title to the property conveyed ultra
vires to the corpoiation,29 the title of the corporation or its grantee to
the property is valid and the state alone can object. There are decisions
of these courts, too, that a corporation doing an ultra vires business
cannot escape a tax on that business 0 and that a corporation which was
holding stock in another corporation ultra viresl could not escape the
statutory double liability imposed upon stockholders. The language
in many of the opinions of these courts, no less emphatically than
their decisions, contradicts the view that the corporation's contract is
void because the corporation had no power to make it. These courts
have said: "It (the ultra vires contract) is valid until assailed in a
direct proceeding instituted for that purpose.
'1 2  And it is a matter
"between the government of the State .... and the corporation, and
is no concern of the defendant." 33  "Restrictions .... upon the amount
of property it may hold cannot be taken advantage of collaterally by
private persons, but only in a direct proceeding by the state which
created it."34  "When a party sells and conveys property to a corpora-
tion, which is without power to purchase and hold the same, and receives
compensation therefor . .. the question becomes one between the cor-
poration and the state."35  "Corporations . . . will be estopped from
denying that they had authority to make such contracts."
38  
"A contract
simply ultra vires is not necessarily unenforcible. It may be enforced
under certain conditions.13 7  And "it may be considered settled law
to-day that where a corporation goes outside of its legitimate business
and makes a contract, and the contract is executed and the corporation
has received the benefits of the contract, the courts will never listen to
a plea of ultra vires.' 38
It is not only true that the law of those jurisdictions which adopt
the doctrine of special powers is incapable of reconciliation with that
doctrine but it seems also impossible to explain, classify, or reconcile
the decisions of those jurisdictions with any existing theory or com-
American & Foreign Christian Union v. Yount (1879) 1oi U. S. 352; Jones
v. Habersham (882) 107 U. S. 174, 2 Sup. Ct 336; see Reynolds v. Bank of
Crawfordsville, supra note 27.
' Salt Lake City v. Hollister (1885) ii8 U. S. 256, 6 Sup. Ct. 1O55.
' See Nat. Bank v. Case, supra note 17, but see also other cases there cited.
' Nat. Bank v. Matthews, supra note 27, at p. 628.
'Cowell v. Springs Co. (1879) 100 U. S. 55, 6o. The corporation here was
allowed to hold real estate necessary to conduct its business; it was argued that
the land in question was not such.
"Jones v. Habershain, supra note 29, at p. I88, 2 Sup. Ct at p. 348.
'Long v. Georgia Pacific Ry. Co. (189o) 91 Ala. 519, 522, 8 So. 706, 707.
Chicago Building Soc. v. Crowell (1872) 65 Il1. 453, 459.
Maryland Trust Co. v. Mechanics' Bank (19o6) 1O2 Md. 6o8, 615, 63 AtI.
70, 72.
"
3Holt v. Winfield Bank (I885, C. C. D. Kan.) 25 Fed. 812, cited with approval
in Tennessee Ice Co. v. Raine, supra note 13, at 156, 64 S. W. at p. 30.
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bination of theories relating to ultra vires. The distinction between
executory and executed ultra vires contracts which obtains in most of
the states will not afford a basis for classifying these decisions. Some
of these courts expressly repudiate the distinction between executory
and executed contracts, as we saw in the National Home Association case
previously quoted. Other cases have adopted that distinction as the
ground of their decisions. Thus in the Oregon Ry. Co. v. Oregonian
Ry. Co.,2 9 an action by the lessor for the rent payable in advance on a
lease for ninety-six years, where the lessee had been in possession for
three years and had paid his rent for the period of occupation, the
court said:
"To say that a contract which runs for ninety-six years, and which
requires of both parties to it continual and actual operations and per-
formance under it, becomes an executed contract by such performance
for less than three years of the term, is carrying the doctrine much
further than it has ever been carried, and is decidedly a misnomer.
This class of cases is not governed by the doctrine of part performance."
Is it not impossible, too, to reconcile consistently with. this distinction
the decisions of the United States Supreme Court holding an ultra vires
lease void where the lessee has been sued for rent for the period of
occupation, 40 and the cases holding an ultra vires conveyance by way of
security valid ;41 or to explain those decisions which hold that a corpo-
ration holding stock in another corporation ultra vires is not subject to
a statutory double liability,4 2 but that a corporation doing an ultra
vires business is liable to a tax on the business3 on the ground that the
executed contract is a foundation of liabilities while an executory one
is not? The confusion reaches a climax in St. Louis, V. & T. H. R. v.
Terre Haute R. 4 -and the Pullman's Car Co. v. Central Transportation
Co.4 1 In the Terre Haute case the court said :48
"While an unlawful contract, the parties to which are in pari delicto,
remains executory, its invalidity is a defense in a court of law; and a
court of equity will order its cancellation only as an equitable mode of
making that defense effectual."
"When the parties are in pari delicto, and the contract has been fully
executed on the part of the plaintiff, by the conveyance of property
or by the payment of money, and has been repudiated by the defendant,it is now equally well settled that neither a court of law nor of equity
'8(IM) 130 U. S. I, 37, 9 Sup. Ct. 409, 417.
"°See supra note 15.
"See supra note 27.
'See supra note 17.
"See supra note 30.
(1891) 145 U. S. 393, 12 Sup. Ct. 953.
"(1898) 171 U. S. 138, 18 Sup. Ct. 8o8.
Supra note 44, at p. 407, 12 Sup. Ct. at p. 957.
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will assist the plaintiff to recover back the property conveyed or the
money paid under the contract."
In the Pullman case the court allows recovery in equity for the reason-
able value of the property which has ceased to exist in specie, and says 
:41
"The right of recovery must rest upon a disaffirmance of the contract,
and it is permitted only because of the desire of the courts to do justice
as far as possible to the party who has made payments or delivered
property under a void agreement and which in justice he ought to
recover."
THE LAW WHERE THE THEORY OF GENERAL POWERS PREVAILS
When we come to those jurisdictions which are free from the con-
fusion resulting from maintaining two contradictory conceptions as
to the nature of corporate powers and which take the view that the
corporation has general powers but is forbidden to act beyond the
authority granted it is more nearly possible to classify the decisions.
If the contract is executory it is invalid, neither party can enforce it.
4 8
This is the law in all the American states except Kansas where there is
a strong opinion in a case holding squarely that the executory contract
is valid.4 9  Where the contract is fully executed on both sides practically
all courts adopting the general capacity theory of the corporation, hold
the contract valid and the foundation of rights and liabilities.
50 Where
the contract has been wholly executed by the plaintiff, whether that be
the corporation or the other party, and the performance has resulted in
benefits to the defendant, the defendant cannot plead ultra vires and
" Supra note 45, at p. 151, 18 Sup. Ct. at p. 813.
,' See I4a C. J. sec. 2166, note 74; Machen, op. cit. supra note 5, sec. 1o58.
'Harris v. Gas Co. (1907) 76 Kan. 750, 92 Pac. 1123.
50 i4a C. J. sec. 2168, note 83; Machen, op. cit. supra note 5, sec. 1048. The
executed contract is a foundation of rights and liabilities. Thus a corporation
which has purchased stock in another corporation ultra vires may maintain an
action to recover dividends that have been declared. Bigbee & W. R. Packet
Co. v. Moore (1898) 121 Ala. 379, 25 So. 602. A corporation which has become
a member of a partnership ultra vires will not be exempted from liability for
partnership debts after the insolvency of the partnership to the prejudice of its
creditors. Wallerstein v. Ervin (19O1, C. C. A. 3d) 112 Fed. 124.
Devises, legacies and conveyances in excess of the amount the corporation is
authorized to hold or for ultra purposes being an executed transaction is treated
by most courts as valid and only subject to objection by the state. Miller v.
Fleningsburget Turnpike Co. (19oo) 22 Ky. Law 1039, 59 S. W. 512; De Camp
v. Dobbins (1878, Ch.) 29 N. J. Eq. 36, questioned but affirmed in (1879) 31 N. J.
Eq. 671; Farrington v. Putnam (1897) go Me. 405, 37 Atl. 652; Hanson v.
Little Sisters of the Poor (1894) 79 Md. 434, 32 Atl. 1O52. Re Strickney's Will
(1897) 85 Md. 79, 36 Atl. 654.
But there is reputable'authority to the effect that the corporation cannot acquire
a good title where it exceeds its charter limits. Re McGraw (1888) III N. Y.
66, ig N. E. 233; Cornell Univ. v. Fisk (18go) 136 U. S. 152, IO Sup. Ct. 775;
House of Mercy v. Davidson (1897) go Tex. 529, 39 S. W. 924 (only in case of
devise); Wood v. Hammond (1888) 16 R. I. 98, 17 At. 324, i8 Atl. ig.
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escape liability.51 When we go beyond this, however, and get into the
"Leon v. Citizens Bldg. & Loan Assn. (1912) 14 Ariz. 294, 127 Pac. 721;
Minneapolis F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Norman (i9o5) 74 Ark. i9o, 85 S. W. 229.
But see North American Union v. Johnson (1920) i42 Ark. 378, 219 S. W. 769;
Bay City Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Broad (I9O2) 136 Calif. 525, 69 Pac. 225;
Lilylands Canal & Reservoir Co. v. Wood (1913) 56 Colo. 130, 136 Pac. iO26;
Denver Fire Ins. Co. v. McClelland (1885) 9 Colo. ii, 9 Pac. 771; In re Litch-
field Co. Agricultural Soc. (1917) 91 Conn. 536, Ioo At. 356; Neillsville Bank v.
Tuthill (1886, Dak.) 3o N. W. 154; McQuaig v. Gulf Naval Stores Co. (ipo8)
56 Fla. 505, 47 So. 2; First National Bank of Wallace v. Callahan Mining Co.
(1916) 28 Idaho, 627, 155 Pac. 673; Muncie Gas Co. v. Muncie (1903) i6o Ind.
97, 104, 66 N. E. 436, 439; Wright v. Hughes (1889) i19 Ind. 324, 21 N. E. 9o7;
Vermont Farm Machinery Co. v. De Soto Co-operative Creamery Co. (io9) 145
Iowa, 491, 122 N. W. 93o; Albin Co. v. Commonwealth (19o8) 128 Ky. 295, io8
S. V. 299; Canal & Claiborne R. R. Co. v. St. Charles Co. (1892) 44 La. Ann.
io69, 1O75, II So. 702, 704; United German Bank v. Katz (1881) 57 Md. 141;
Black v. First Nat. Bank of Westminster (1go3) 96 Md. 399, 54 Atl. 88; Slater
Woolen Co. v. Lamb (1886) 143 Mass. 42o, 9 N. E. 823; Hall Mfg. Co. v.
American Ry. Supply Co. (1882) 48 Mich. 331, 12 N. W. 205; Dewey v. Toledo
& A. Ry. Co. (1892) 91 Mich. 351, 51 N. W. 1O63; Timin v. Grand Rapids
Brewing Co. (iio) 16o Mich. 371, 125 N. W. 357; Blackwood v. Lansing Cham-
ber of Commerce (1914) 178 Mich. 321, 144 N. W. 823; -Northland Produce Co.
v. Stephens (1911) II6 Minn. 23, 133 N. W. 93; Watts Mercantile Co. v.
Buchanan (i9o8) 92 Miss. 540, 46 So. 66; City of St. Louis v. St. Louis Ry. Co.
(1913) 248 MO. IO, 154 S. W. 55; Schlitz Brewing Co. v. Missouri Poultry &
Grain Co. (1921) 287 Mo. 400, 229 S. W. 813; Latulippe v. New England Invest.
Co. (1913) 77 N. H. 31, 86 Atl. 361; Camden & Atl. R. R. Co. v. Mays Landing
Co. (1886) 48 N. J. L. 530, 7 At. 523; Chapman v. Iron Clad Rheostat Co.
(1898) 62 N. J. L. 497, 4 Atl. 690; United States Industrial Alcohol Co. v.
Distilling Co. (1918) 89 N. 3. Eq. 177, 1O4 At. 216; Woollard Co. v. City of
Albany (1921, Sup. Ct.) i9o N. Y. Supp. 741; Board of Trustees of Charlotte v.
Realty Co. (1903) 134 N. C. 41, 49, 46 S. E. 723, 725; Tourtelot v. Whithed
(19oo) 9 N. D. 407, 84 N. W. 8; Clarke v. Olson (igoo) 9 N. D. 364, 83 N. W.
519; Ewing v. Board of Com.'rs. Ellis Co. (1916) 53 Okla. 25o, 156 Pac. 229;
Roane v. Union Pac. Life Ins. Co. (1913) 67 Or. 2.64, 135 Pac. 892; Pittsburgh
R. R. Co. v. Altoona R. R. Co. (igoo) 196 Pa. 452, 46 Atl. 431; Presbyterian
Board v. Gilbee (195o) 212 Pa. 31o, 314, 61 Adt. 925, 926; Lemmon v. East
Palestine Rubber Co. (1918) 26o Pa. 28, 103 At. 51o; Kammer v. Supreme
Lodge (1912) 91 S. C. 572, 75 S. E. 177; Amer. Nat. Bank v. Wheeler-Adams
Auto Co. (1913) 31 S. D. 524, 141 N. W. 396; Bond v. Terrell Co. (i89i) 82
Tex. 309, 18 S. W. 691; Kincheloe Irr. Co. v. Hahn Bros. (1912) lO5 Tex. 231,
146 S. W. 1187; Bear River Co. v. Hanley (1897) 15 Utah, 5o6, 5o Pac. 611;
News-Register Co. v. Rockingham Pub. Co. (1915) 118 Va. 14o, 86 S. E. 874;
Spencer v. Alki Point Trans. Co. (9o9) 53 Wash. 77, ioi Pac. 509; McElroy v.
Minnesota Co. (1897) 96 Wis. 317, 71 N. W. 652; Ledebuhr v. Wisconsin Trust
Co. (1902) 112 Wis. 657, 662, 88 N. W. 607, 6og.
It is perhaps proper in most cases to confine the plaintiff's right to recover
on the ultra vires contract to cases where he has completely performed the
contract and to deny him relief on the contract partially performed by him.
Western Md. Ry. v. Blue Ridge Hotel Co., supra note ii; Day v. Spiral
Springs Buggy Co. (1885) 57 Mich. 146, 23 N. W. 628; Mallory v. Hananer Oil
Works (1888) 86 Tenn. 598, 8 S. W. 396.
He should have quasi-contractual relief for the benefits bestowed. See Day v.
Spiral Springs Buggy Co., supra; Mallory v. Hananer Oil Works, supra.
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field of the partially executed contract where performance has not
resulted in benefits to the defendant, 2 there is less unanimity in the
decisions of the courts. Several courts refuse relief to the party
contracting with the corporation where he knew or should have known
of the unauthorized character of the transaction." Some courts attach
importance to the fact that the stockholders have or have not assented
to the transaction.54 Others apparently attach no importance to that
fact.55
THE GROUNDS UPON WHICH -ULTRA VIRES RESTS
Having considered the status of the decisions relating to ultra vires
let us now turn to examine the soundness of the grounds upon which
the decisions rest. The comparatively few cases in which reasons are
given for the decisions afford us a variety of inconsistent bases. The
courts have treated ultra vires transactions as void, invalid, or unen-
forcible upon the following grounds: because the corporation lacked the
power to make the contract,5" because it was illegal,5 7 because the party
who dealt with the corporation was charged with notice of the limits
of the corporation's power,58 because the transaction was opposed to the
interest of the public that the corporation should not transcend its
charter powers,5 9 because it violated the rights of creditors60 or of stock-
holders"' not to have the funds of the corporation risked in enterprises
not contemplated in the articles of incorporation. Where the ultra vires
The courts allowing recovery on the ultra vires contract usually do so on
the basis of estoppel and many of them recite the fact of receipt of benefits as
the basis of the estoppel. See Martin v. Niagara Falls Co. (189o) 122 N. Y.
165, 25 N. E. 3o3 (recovery and no benefits).
National Home Building Ass. v. Home Savings Bank, supra note 9; Franklin
National Bank v. Whitehead (1898) 149 Ind. 143, 49 N. E. 592; Geraghty v.
Washtenaw Co. (19o6) 145 Mich. 635, io8 N. W. iio2; Pittsburgh R. Co. v.
Keokuk Bridge Co. (1889) 131 U. S. 371, 9 Sup. Ct. 770.
"Huguenot Mills v. Jemnpson (19o4) 68 S. C. 363, 47 S. E. 687; Martin v.
Niagara Falls, supra note 52.
'See footnote to Warren, Executory Ultra Vires Transactions in (igii) 24
HAv. L. Rav. 534, 543. See also cases cited in x4a C. J. sec. 2164, notes 59 and
58; also sec. 2165.
See supra notes 6 to 14 inclusive.
Machen, op. cit. supra note 5, sec. 1O2O; Harriman, Ultra Vires Corporation
Leases (goi) I4"HAav. L. REV. 332; Warren, op. cit. supra note 54, at p. 537.
'Pittsburgh R. Co. v. Keokuk Bridge Co., supra note 53, Atlantic & Pacific
Telegraph Co. v. Union Pac. R. Co. (i88o, C. C. D. Neb.) i Fed. 745; Davis v.
Old- Colony R. Co., supra note 12; Lucas v. White Line Transfer Co. (1886) 70
Iowa, 542, 30 N. W. 771.
See supra note 58.
This reason is discussed by Warren, op. cit. supra note 55, at pp. 540 and 541.
Warren, op. cit. supra note 55, at pp. 538 et seq.; Pittsburgh R. Co. v. Keokuk
Bridge Co., supra note 53, at p. 384, 9 Sup. Ct. at p. 774.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
contract is upheld it is usually put upon the ground of estoppel, 62 or
consideration of fairness between the parties.3 Let us now look partic-
ularly at these grounds.
I. Incapacity
Is the theory of special powers sound or preferable to the theory of
general powers? Should the ultra vires contract be treated as void,
invalid or unenforcible because the corporation lacked the power to
make it? If the corporation is conceived of as deriving its existence
and its powers from the state, it is a logical inference that every contract
or transaction in excess of the powers granted is void. The concept
of special powers is not in itself illogical. 4 Neither is there any objec-
tion to it on the score of its being difficult to understand or apply or
that its consistent application would not give certainty and definiteness
to the law. The real objections to it are that it will not explain the
actual decisions, even in a single jurisdiction, that it does not represent
truly the nature of a corporation, and that it-works harsh and unjust
results. The law of ultra vires in these jurisdictions which purport to
follow the doctrine of special powers cannot be strongly urged as
authority for that doctrine or against the doctrine of general powers.
In all jurisdictions the liability of corporations for tort is upheld.6 5
This is true even of the statutory corporation in England where the
" See supra note 51.
€' Neillsville Bank v. Tuthill, supra note 51; McQuaig v. Gulf Naval Stores
Co., supra note 51; Dewey v. Railway Co., supra note 51; Watts Mercantile Co.
v. Buchanan, supra note 51; Bear River Co. v. Hanley, supra note 51.
'It has been objected to the doctrine of special powers that, "All rights are
in one sense creatures of the law, and it is in a special sense by creation of the
law that artificial persons exist at all; but when you have got your artificial
person, why call in a second special creation to account for its rights?" Pollock,
Contracts (2d Am. ed. 1885) 121. This statement is approved in Harriman,
loc. cit. supra note 54.
But is not this objection specious? Does the conception of the corporation
as an artificial person deriving its powers from governmental fiat call for a
second special act of creation? Is there any necessity for assuming that the
result of the special fiat of creation must have produced an artificial person
with all the legal characteristics of a normal natural person, or with any certain
particular characteristics? Natural persons vary in characteristics, for instance,
married women and infants do not have all the capacities of adult men. It is
not inherently impossible to conceive of hoth the existence and the capacities,
limited or otherwise, as having their origin in the original special act of creation.
It is submitted that there is no difficulty in logic with the doctrine of special
powers. It should be noted that Pollock's criticism is omitted in the ninth
edition (1921) of his work.
Mason, J., in Harris v. Gas Co. (1907) 76 Kan. 750, 752, 92 Pac. 123, 1124,
in speaking of the theory of special capacities, says: "The theory is consistent
and logical, but its practical effect is so to circumscribe the power of the court
as to make the relief furnished at times inadequate to the occasion."
' Machen, op. cit. supra note 5, sec. 1O72.
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doctrine of special capacities has been most rigidly adhered to. And
is it not apparent that liability in tort is inconsistent with absence of
all capacity? The inconsistency of the decisions with the doctrine of
special powers is carried further in the United States than in England.
In very many cases the United States Supreme Court has not only held
the contract valid as between the parties,
6 but has said that no one
but the state can question the validity of the ultra vires 
undertaking ;6T
and there is not a single state that has not upheld the validity of some
ultra vires transactions. 8s Clearly this cannot be done without con-
tradicting the doctrine of special powers. For to grant that a corpora-
tion may in some cases or for some purposes validly exercise powers in
excess of those granted by the state is to deny that it may not have
powers beyond those granted. Consistently with authority, then, the
doctrine of special powers cannot stand.
When a group of persons may agree together to form a corporation
and decide upon the powers they shall provide for it-and the state is
helpless to prevent the formation of the corporation with such powers
so long as those persons go through the formality of complying with
certain statutory requirements-it seems a little inaccurate to describe
the corporation as an entity created by the state and deriving its powers
therefrom. The conception of the corporation as a group of persons
acting as a legal unit seems to accord more nearly with its real nature.
This conception of the corporation, too, has the advantage of allowing
flexibility in the treatment of the problem of ultra vires not to be had
consistently with the theory of special powers. It does not necessitate
the imposition of an inappropriate and harsh penalty for a slight techni-
cal omission. It does not require the frequently unjust result of allow-
ing one of the parties to a contract to take unfair advantage of the
other. It may best subserve the legitimate interests of the parties
concerned.
2. Illegality
Can the doctrine of ultra vires rest on illegality? The term illegal
applies not only to those contracts which are inimical to social welfare
but to those which are prohibited by statute for whatever purpose.
69
'Supra; notes 27 to 31 inclusive.
Supra notes 32 to 34 inclusive.
'There is no need to cite cases from the states that follow the doctrine
of general powers. Of the states following the doctrine of special powers I
cite the following cases which uphold the validity of ultra vires transactions:
Long v. Geo. Pacific Ry. Co., supra note 35; Bigbee Packet Co. v. Moore (1899)
121 Ala. 379, 25 So. 602; Bradley v. Ballard (187o) 55 Ill. 413; Oakland Elec.
Co. v. Union Gas Co. (191o) 1O7 Me. 279, 78 Atl. 288; Black v. First National
Bank, supra note ii; Slater Woolen Co. v. Lamb, supra note 12; Preston v.
West's Beach Corp. (1907) 195 Mass. 482, 81 N. E. 253; Barrow v. Nashville &
Charlotte Co. (1848) 28 Tenn. 304; Heiskell v. Chickasaw Lodge (1889) 87
Tenn. 668, 1I S. W. 825; News-Register Co. v. Rockingham P. Co., supra note 51.
'Woodward, Quasi-Contracts (1913) sec. 132.
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Under our method of organizing corporations they are impliedly pro-
hibited by statute from making contracts beyond their authorized powers.
Ultra vires contracts must then in one sense be considered as illegal.
But should the ultra vires contract be treated as an ordinary illegal
contract?
The nature of the objection to the ultra vires contract differs funda-
mentally from the nature of the objection to the illegal contract. The
objection to the illegal contract as distinguished from the ultra vires
contract relates to the subject matter. The law forbids the actual per-
formance of certain acts because they are opposed to social welfare and
the contract to do such acts is obnoxious for that reason. The plaintiff
who undertakes to do'acts that are inimical to social welfare is a wrong-
doer to whom the law denies relief.70  He is a wrongdoer-outside the
pale of the law. The objection to the ultra vires contract on the other
hand relates to the capacity of the corporation to do such acts, to the
fact that the corporation is going beyond the authority given it in the
articles of incorporation. There is nothing inimical to social welfare
in ultra vires activity in itself. It is absurd to treat the corporation
and the party to the ultra vires contract as wrongdoers to whom the law
denies relief on the ground that they are engaged in activities that are
opposed to the welfare of society.
Illegality will not explain the law of ultra vires. Treating the ultra
vires contract as an illegal contract will not give a result that is con-
sonant with the decisions.
It is true that where the contract is still wholly executory or where
it is fully executed the results reached by the decisions is the same in
the case of the ultra vires contract as it would be in case the action
was brought upon an ordinary illegal contract. For in both cases the
contracts are unenforcible while still executory, but are effectual if fully
executed. But where the contract is neither wholly executory nor fully
executed the results reached in these two different classes of cases
diverge. This is true whether the action is contractual or quasi-con-
tractual. Where the plaintiff has performed, the majority of the
American courts' allow recovery on the contract in case of ultra vires71
but deny it in case of the ordinary illegal contract."2 In some cases the
courts seem to have been harsher with ultra vires than ordinary illegal
contracts. An innocent plaintiff is allowed to enforce the ordinary
illegal contract" but there seems to be no recognition of any rule that a
plaintiff may enforce an ultra vires contract because he is innocent.
The quasi-contract relief that is granted in case of ultra vires con-
tracts will not always correspond with the quasi-contract relief that is
granted in case of illegal contracts. In case of ultra vires contracts
'03 Williston, Contracts (1920) secs. 1628, 163o.
" See supra note 51.
"Woodward, op. cit. supra note 69, sec. 132.
"Williston, op. cit. supra note 7o, sec. 1631.
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where the plaintiff's performance has resulted in the bestowal of benefits
upon the defendant for which he has not given compensation, the courts
practically always allow the plaintiff who is not allowed to recover on
the contract to recover of the defendant for the unjust enrichment.74
In the case of the illegal contract the general rule is that the plaintiff
cannot recover for the benefit conferred.7 5 But there are exceptions.
If the contract is not malum in se but nalum prohibitum the plaintiff,
if he was either ignorant of the fact which made the contract illegal,
or was not in pari delicto with the defendant or withdrew from the con-
tract before the illegal purpose was accomplished, may recover.76 While
it is true that some cases of ultra vires if treated for that reason as
illegal would fall under these exceptions, it is clear that many would
not. The relief that is given by the courts quasi-contractually in case
of ultra vires action is much broader than is given in case of illegality.
It is undesirable to treat the ultra vires contract as an ordinary illegal
one. To deny relief quasi-contractually where benefits have been con-
ferred, as this would require in some cases, is harsh; or to confine the
plaintiff in case any relief is granted to relief quasi-contractually is
frequently unjust. This is particularly apparent in contracts of guar-
anty and insurance where the plaintiff pays a comparatively small sum
for the undertaking of a risk by the defendant and relying upon having
the obligation of the defendant suffers a great loss. Quasi-contract
relief will confine him to a recovery of the premiums paid.77
It will not do then to rest ultra vires upon illegality. To do so is
unsound theoretically and gives us results that are not only incompatible
with the decisions but undesirable because unfair.
3. Notice
Should the party who contracts with the corporation be barred from
recovery on the ultra vires contract upon the ground that he is charged
with notice of the limitation of the power of the corporation, as set
forth in its charter or articles of incorporation, or as provided by statute?
A comparison of the principles involved in the case of notice of
limitations of the authority of an agent or a partner may be helpful
here. One who deals with an agent can only hold the principal (aside
from estoppel) where the agent has actual authority. The agent's
ostensible authority implied from custom and usage may have express
limitations upon it, yet the third party who makes a contract with the
agent within the ostensible authority, but beyond the express limitations,
can hold the principal liable so long as he did not know of these limita-
tions, and acted with ordinary prudence and reasonable diligence and
"'Woodward, op. cit. supra note 69, sec. 16o.
"Ibid. see. 13z
"'Ibid. secs. 136-145.
"Denver Fire Ins. Co. v. McClelland, supra note 51.
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in good faith, not "wilfully shutting his eyes to restrictions which would
otherwise be obvious." 78 This is true of one who makes a contract with
one of the partners of a partnership. He is not bound by any limita-
tions imposed upon the ostensible powers of partners in the articles of
partnership, unless he has actual notice or fails to act with ordinary
prudence or in good faith with respect to such restriction. The notice
of limitations upon the power of the corporation that is charged to the
party contracting with the corporation goes beyond the notice with
which the party who contracts with the agent or partner is charged, in
two respects: first, the party contracting with the corporation is charged
with the knowledge of the provisions of the articles of incorporation,
regardless of whether it is reasonable to do so or not, and he is charged
with knowing, at his peril, whether a court will agree with him that the
contemplated contract is within its powers-this too when the precedents
which are to guide the court in reaching its decision are in the greatest
conflict. The unreasonable character of the doctrine has been strongly
pointed out by some of the courts. In Denver'Fire Ins. Co. v. McClel-
land,79 where it was strongly urged that one dealing with a corporation
is bound to know the extent of its powers to contract, Justice Stone
replied:
"While as a general proposition this is true, yet it must be conceded
that this constructive notice is of a very vague and shadowy character.
Every one may have access to the statutes of the states affecting com-
panies incorporated thereunder, and to their articles of incorporation,
but to impute a knowledge of the probable construction the courts would
put upon these statutes and articles of incorporation to determine ques-
tions raised upon a given contract proposed, is carrying the doctrine
of notice to an extent which can only be denominated preposterous."
In Bissdll v. Michigan Southern R. Co.80 Judge Comstock concludes his
opinion with the observation:
".A traveler from New York to the Mississippi can hardly be required
to furnish himself with the charters of all the railroads on his route, or
to study a treatise on the law of corporations."
And, second, not only is the party contracting with the corporation
charged with knowledge where it is unreasonable to impute it to him,
but, unlike the case of principal and agent where the principal assented,
he will be unable to hold the corporation liable on the contract, even if
all the stockholders assented to the contract.8 The vice in the contract
is not that a non-assenting principal is bound, but that the contract is bad
for illegality, and the plaintiff being charged with notice of the illegal
character of the contract is a wrongdoer to whom the law denies relief.
There is this difference between the position of one who deals with
'Mechem, Agency (2d ed. 1914) secs. 751-753.
"Supra note 51, at p. 22, 9 Pac. at p. 777.
s ( c86o) 22 N. Y. 258, 28.Cases collected, 14a C. J. sec. 2164, note 59.
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a corporation and one who deals with a partner or an agent. The
powers of the corporation are defined in an instrument which is made
a matter of public record. But this does not necessarily mean the party
dealing with the corporation has actual notice nor is it proper consider-
ing the way ordinary business is done to charge the one who deals with
the corporation with constructive notice. The objections to constructive
notice are well expressed in the quotations from the opinions of Justices
Stone and Comstock just made.
It is submitted that in so far as the doctrine of notice in ultra vires
contracts goes beyond agency and partnership law, it is unfair, unrea-
sonable, and uncalled for upon any ground of public policy. And it is
certainly contrary to the great weight of American authority.
4. Opposed to Public Policy
How far is the public, as distinct from the creditors and stockholders
of the corporation, interested in the corporation not transcending the
limits of its charter? It is important here to distinguish between ultra
vires acts which are in themselves inimical to social welfare and those
which are free from objection except that they are not authorized. If
the acts are objectionable in themselves no doctrine of ultra vires is
needed to protect the public. For the transaction will be treated as
bad on the ground of public policy either at common law or by statute;
in other words the transaction will be treated as illegal in its proper
sense. If there is an express statutory prohibition it is clearly a matter
for statutory interpretation. Some courts have treated clear and explicit
statutory prohibitions upon the making of ultra vires contracts as
requiring them to construe the contract as void. 2 A state may provide
that an illegal contract be absolutely void, but even then courts will
incline to treat it as voidable and should not treat it as void if any
other interpretation is possible4 3 At any rate the doctrine of ultra
vires should not be invoked to interfere with an ,appropriate interpreta-
tion of the statute. In fact all ultra vires transactions might properly
be treated as coming under the head of statutory construction, for
statutory prohibition express or implied, exists. One learned writer
has so treated the question.8 4 But such treatment would be destructive
of the prevailing doctrine of ultra vires and would not necessarily
involve treating the contract which was not opposed to social welfare
as invalid.
If the transaction is one that is not expressly forbidden by statute
or objectionable because inimical to public welfare but is merely beyond
the powers stipulated for in the articles of incorporation and it is one
' Pratt v. Short (188o) 79 N. Y. 437; Mutual Guaranty Fire Ins. Co. v. Barker
(1899) 1O7 Iowa, 143, 77 N. W. 868.
8 3 Williston, op. cit. supra note 70, sec. 1630.
Pepper, op. 'cit. supra note 4.
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which the corporation might enter into free from all possible objection
by merely amending its articles to include the otherwise forbidden busi-
ness, does it not seem wholly untenable to say that in such case the public
is interested in the corporation not entering into the ultra vires transac-
tion? If the procedure of allowing amendment to the articles is a
guide as to what the state has deemed of public interest it is clear that
the state is not interested in the corporation refraining from doing the
particular act, but rather that the powers of the corporation be made
a matter of public record. To rest the doctrine of ultra vires and to
strike down the contract between the parties, frequently to the grievous
wrong of one of the parties and to the unfair advantage of the other
upon such shadowy and nebulous grounds as public policy seems wholly
unwarranted. On the other hand real considerations of public policy
as opposed to fanciful ones favor giving validity to the contract. There
is the public policy of justice involved in men keeping their contracts.
It has been suggested that "public policy is wounded in the deepest sense
when the courts of justice educate men in the breaking of their con-
tracts and in the repudiation of their just obligations, on theoretical,
speculative and fanciful grounds." '
Should the state have a right to object to ultra vires transactions?
"The rule is still commonly declared to be universal that the exercise of
power not reserved in the charter exposes the corporation to quo war-
ranto by the Attorney-General and a judgment of ouster." 86  There
seems to be a tendency to break away from the recognition of an abso-
lute right, if indeed there ever was any such right. It is said that courts
may exercise their discretion, 87 and should not declare forfeiture except
for wilful abuse or neglect.8 8  But should not the rule be that where
the transaction in question involves activity clearly adverse to a public
right or a public interest the state should have a right to interfere and
not otherwise? It might be necessary in some instances to provide for
such right by statute but the right should exist independently of any
question of ultra vires. The mere fact that a corporation acts in excess
of its charter powers does not mean that its action is adverse to public
interest. To say that there is'a public policy in favor of keeping the
corporation within its chartr limits is vague 5 and in most cases is
untrue. As to whether the action is adverse to public interest the same
test should be applied to the corporate person as to the natural person.
If the-act is unobjectionable in itself and if no specific public interest
is involved why should the state have any right to interfere? Since
Thompson, op. cit. supra note 4, at p. 405.
'Lilienthal, Non-Public Corporations and Ultra Vires (1898) II HARv. L. REv.
387. See also Whitney Armr Co. v. Barlow (1875) 63 N. Y. 62.
'State v. Essex Bank (1836) 8 Vt. 489.
,' See cases collected, 2 Morawetz, Private Corporations (2d ed. I888) 984,
notes 2 and 3, and 985, note i.
' See Gray, J., Leslie v. Lorillard (1888) 1io N. Y. 519, 531, 18 N. E. 363, 365.
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the corporation would usually have the right to amend its charter and
then engage in the otherwise forbidden activity, the only fault on the
part of the corporation is the failure to record an amended charter.
Forfeiture for a technical omission of the nature here involved is a harsh
and unscientific penalty to impose.
5. It Violates the Interests of Creditors
The violation of the interests of creditors can hardly be urged as a
sufficient ground upon which to rest the doctrine of ultra vires. It is
probably the law that the creditor has no right to complain of an ultra
vires transaction unless his security is endangered. 0 This is a right
that should exist independently of any doctrine of ultra vires. It would
hardly seem justifiable to establish for the benefit of creditors a doctrine
which would result in annulling a contract deliberately entered into,
when the creditors' own interest is considered insufficient to entitle them
to direct relief. In fact the courts have not seriously treated the
creditors' interest as requiring the doctrine of ultra vires for its proper
protection.
6. It Violates the Rights of Stockholders
Is the fact that an ultra vires transaction is a violation of the rights
of the stockholders a sufficient basis upon which to rest the doctrine of
ultra vires? It must be admitted that the stockholders are the persons
who are most vitally interested in the corporation's risk when it enters
in ultra vires transactions, for it means embarking in an enterprise not
contemplated in the articles of incorporation. If the officers of the
corporation enter into an ultra vires contract without the assent of the
stockholder they violate his contract. For this he has his remedy. He
may sue the officers for breach of contract. If the contract has not
been entered into but is about to be made he can enjoin the officers.
These remedies he has without resorting to the doctrine of ultra vires.
Should his remedy go further and relieve the corporation on the
contract in order to further protect him? If the one who contracts with
the corporation knows of the limitations upon the power of the corpora-
tion or if he ought to have known of this limitation, and the stockholder
is not assenting, his position is somewhat analogous to that of one who
contracts with an agent with knowledge that he is exceeding the limita-
tion upon his authority and he should not be allowed to hold the corpora-
tion liable on the contract. But to deny him the right to hold the
corporation on the contract does not involve an application of the doc-
trine of ultra vires. The simple principles of agency or partnership law
will suffice to reach that result. A party contracting with an agent with
knowledge, actual or constructive, of the limitations upon the agent's
'Mills v. Northerus Ry. (187o) L. R. 5 Ch. App. 621, Warren, op. cit. supra
note 54, at p. 541.
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power cannot hold the principal liable. The limitation upon the implied
powers of partners are effective as against one who knew or ought to
have known of the limitations. On the other hand, the'party who con-
tracts with an agent or a partner who is acting in excess of limitations
on his power but within the range of the power implied from the nature
* of the business or from custom or usage may hold the principal or part-
nership liable, pxovided he does not know of the limitation, for it is
not reasonable to charge him with notice. Should not this rule of part-
nership and agency law be the criterion in corporation law? Why
should we invoke a different system of rules from those of the ordinary
partnership? The fact that the shares of the corporation are trans-
ferable and the stockholders liability is limited does not demand the
application of a different rule in this matter. Persons who contract
with the corporation ought not at their peril to be required to ascertain
the limits of the corporation's power. They should be allowed to hold
the corporation liable wherever it is not reasonable for them to be charged
with this knowledge. Is there any better place to draw the line as to
where it is reasonable to charge them with notice than where the courts
have drawn it in case of agency and partnership law? One court has
said, "Upon any other principle there would be no safety in dealing
with corporations, and the business operations of these institutions
would be greatly crippled, while the interests of the stockholders and of
the public, and their general usefulness, would be seriously impaired.
The officers are appointed by the corporation, and if any loss results
to strangers dealing with the corporation from their misrepresentation
in matters within the general scope of their duties, it should fall upon
the corporation, which is responsible for their appointment, rather than
upon parties who have no other means of ascertaining the facts, and
must rely upon their assurance or not deal with the corporation at all."' "
7. Estoppel
As we have seen most of the American courts which uphold the
validity of ultra vires contracts do so on the ground that where the
plaintiff has performed, and the defendant has received benefits from
that performance, the defendant is estopped to deny the validity of the
contract.9 2 The defendant in receiving the goods treats the contract as
valid and he ought not now to be allowed to turn around and take an
inconsistent position to his own advantage and plaintiff's detriment.
So the courts says he is estopped to take that inconsistent position.
But is estoppel a sufficient ground to support these ultra vires contracts
which under the law are otherwise unsupportable? If the facts existed
for a proper basis of estoppel it is clear that if the basis for holding
the ultra vires contract is incapacity on the part of the corporation to
Miners" Ditch Co. v. Zellerbach (1869) 37 Calif. 543, 588.
See cases cited in note 51 supra.
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make the contract, or illegality of the contract, or because the outsider
has notice of the limitations upon the corporation's power to make the
contract, estoppel would not serve to make the contract valid. It may
be unfair for the defendant who has received performance of the con-
tract by the plaintiff to try to escape performance upon his part, but
while receipt of the performance may be said to constitute a representa-
tion of an intent to perform the contract it does not constitute a repre-
sentation of the validity of the contract and clearly in case the plaintiff
is the corporation it does not constitute a representation to one ignorant
of the truth and therefore one upon which the plaintiff has relied to
its detriment. Entering into an agreement affords as much basis for
estopping the plaintiff from denying validity to the contract as accepting
performance of the contract. But such a doctrine would make all
agreements valid. As has been said by one learned judge, "The prin-
ciple referred to, if sound, is manifestly sufficient to defeat the defense
of ultra vires even when interposed against the enforcement of an
executory contract; but it must be admitted that in practice it seems to
have been applied only where the agreements have been at least partially
performed."93 1
The true basis upon which to support the ultra vires contract is not
estoppel or fairness between the parties but the simple ground that it
is a contract between the parties to which there is no valid objection. It
needs no support for there is no sufficient ground for treating it as
invalid.
JUDICIAL LEGISLATION
One eminent author raises the objection of judicial legislation as a
reason why the courts should not attempt to abandon the doctrine of
ultra vires. He says, "If the question were res integra, the inclina-
tion to take this extreme view of the matter would doubtless be very
strong; but at this late day a court which takes this position without
any affirmative legislative sanction would seem to be almost if not quite
guilty of unsurping the function of the legislature."9 4
Is this view sound? In the first place would discarding the doctrine
of ultra vires by the courts constitute judicial legislation? Would a
court by allowing an action on the executory ultra vires contract be
guilty of judicial legislation? Bear in mind that the further step, a
slight one in some jurisdictions, of giving relief on the executory con-
tract practically completes the disintegration of the doctrine. When we
consider that all of the Arherican states have at least in some cases made
decisions which are only reconcilable with the theory of general capaci-
ties and have used language, the consistent application of which would
require the enforcement of all ultra vires contracts whether executory
"Mason, J., in Harris v. Gas Co. (1o7) 76 Kan. 750, 757, 92 Pac. 1123, 1125.
" Machen, op. cit. supra note 5, sec. 858.
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or only partially executed, and that that would mean an abandoment of
the doctrine of ultra vires, does the criticism seem in point? If a court's
decision makes for a sounder precedent, one more consistent with the
general body of the common law, and tends to secure greater justice
between the parties who are and will be involved in such activities, and
does not tend to upset vested rights or unsettle precedents in cognate
lines other than those directly overruled, then the decision is highly
desirable and it is questionable whether it constitutes judicial legislation.
In the second place if it does fall within what is called judicial legislation,
the reply is that it is still desirable. If that is judicial legislation then
one of the things we most need is more judicious judicial legislation,
though it may be undesirable to have the unjudicious sort. If to aban-
don the doctrine of ultra vires constitutes judicial legislation then I
should say that the whole body of the common law which the courts
have built up through the centuries is open to that objection.
CONCLUSION
When corporations came into existence through special act of the
legislature it was not inaccurate to conceive of the corporation as an
artificial entity deriving its existence and powers from the state, but
when corporations are organized under general laws as they are to-day,
and persons are permitted to associate themselves together to form a
corporation with such power, practically, as they shall provide, this
conception becomes noticeably inaccurate. The doctrine of special capa-
cities is harsh and inflexible and the attempt to break away from it
while holding to it in part has introduced great confusion into the law,
for every time that corporate action which is ultra vires is held valid
involves a denial of the doctrine of special capacities and a following
of the doctrine of general powers. When, however, the doctrine of
general powers is followed there is no logical or proper halting place
short of a complete denial of the doctrine of ultra vires. The attempt
to stop short has introduced more confusion into the law, necessitating
as it does the discovery of some grounds upon which to base such deci-
sions. The theories propounded have been insufficient in themselves
and have not been consistently applied. The ground most commonly
given, at least aside from incapacity, for holding the ultra vires trans-
action invalid is illegality, but to treat the ultra vires contract as invalid
because of illegality is undesirable from a practical standpoint, unsound
theoretically, and does not explain the decisions. The same criticism
may be made of treating the ultra vires contract as invalid on the ground
,that the one who dealt with the corporation is charged with notice of
the harter limitations. To deny validity to the contract on the ground
that it is opposed to public policy is going too far, for there is no public
interest apart from the interest of particular groups of persons which
are protected and only I roperly by a direct right in the persons con-
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cerned. In special cases where the public has an interest better pro-
tected by state interference, such as in the care of insurance and banking,
the matter is only properly taken care of by special legislation. When
it comes to the protection of the special group of persons most inter-
ested, namely the stockholders, there is no demand for the doctrine of
ultra vires. The rights between the stockholders and the party who
deals with the corporation are better and adequately taken care of by
the application of the principles of partnership and agency law.
In conclusion I say there is no excuse for continued adherence to the
doctrine of ultra vires. It is not based upon any sound theory or
demand of public policy. It results in confusion, uncertainty and injus-
tice in the law. Considerations of fair dealing, and freedom in business
activities are opposed to it. Particular situations may demand special
legislation but in general the principles of the lawof agency and part-
nership provide a more satisfactory solution of the problem involved.
